Capital Plan Methodology

Capital Plan Assumptions

• The FY2020-29 Capital Plan uses the Annual Infrastructure Construction Cost Inflation Estimate (AICCIE) of 6% as the escalation rate for the first 2 years, followed by 5% for the remainder of the Plan.
• Fiscal years (FY) in the Plan refer to the calendar year in which the City’s July 1 to June 30 budget cycle ends. For example, FY2020 refers to calendar year dates from July 1, 2019 to June 30, 2020.
• Dollars are listed in thousands for all financial schedules unless otherwise noted.
• For all planned General Obligation Bonds, the financial schedules show the total bond amount in the fiscal year during which the bond is to be approved by voters. For example, a G.O. Bond proposal on the November 2018 ballot will appear in FY2019 of the financial schedule.
• The General Obligation Bond Program assumes growth in Net Assessed Value of 6.49% in FY2020, 4.51% in FY2021, 4.31% in FY2022, 4.03% in FY2023, 4.03% in FY2024, and 3.50% annually thereafter.
• When issued, G.O. Bonds proposed by this Plan will not increase voters’ long-term property tax rates above FY2006 levels. In other words, new G.O. Bonds will only be used as funding source when existing approved and issued debt is retired and/or the property tax base grows.
• The General Fund Debt Program assumes that General Fund discretionary revenues grow 4.50% in FY2020, 3.79% in FY2021, 3.15% in FY2022, 2.97% in FY2023, 3.19% in FY2024, and 3.50% annually thereafter. In addition, the General Fund Debt Program assumes that the amount of General Fund revenues spent on debt service will not exceed 3.25%.
• The Pay-As-You-Go Program assumes General Fund and Senate Bill 1 Street Repaving as revenue sources.

Jobs Creation Estimation Methodology

 Source: Economic Multipliers from Office of Economic Analysis, Controller’s Office, REMI Model Outputs

Infrastructure Finance Districts Criteria

1. Limit to areas that are rezoned as part of an Area Plan or Development Agreement approved by the Board of Supervisors (BOS) and also adopted as a Planned Priority Development Area (PDA) by the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG). Priority Development Areas (PDAs) are locally-identified, infill development opportunity areas within existing communities. They are generally areas of at least 100 acres where there is local commitment to developing more housing along with amenities and services to meet the day-to-day needs of residents in a pedestrian-friendly environment served by transit. To be eligible to become a PDA, an area has to be within an existing community, near existing or planned fixed transit or served by comparable bus service, and planned for more housing. Designation of PDAs expresses the region’s growth priorities and informs regional agencies, like the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC), which jurisdictions want and need assistance. Planned PDAs are eligible for capital infrastructure funds, planning grants, and technical assistance. Linking creation of future IFDs to areas designated as PDAs will allow the City to leverage the increment generated by an IFD to increase its chances to receive matching regional, state, or federal infrastructure and transportation grants.
2. Limit to areas where a rezoning results in a net fiscal benefit to the General Fund as determined by the Controller’s Office. Specifically, the City must demonstrate that any added General Fund costs generated by the new service population projected to result from the growth supported by a rezoning are offset by greater General Fund revenues, resulting in a net fiscal benefit or surplus. As a general rule, this would mean that use of IFDs would be limited to areas that received substantial & quantifiable upzoning, based on actual net increases in height, bulk, density that result in greater developable FAR than the previous “baseline” zoning, or through liberalization of land use and permitting provisions that increase the certainty of entitlements and the value of property.
3. In general, restrict the maximum increment available to an annual average of 33-50% over the 30-year term of the IFD, and in no event allow the annual average increment over the life of the IFD to exceed the projected net fiscal benefit over the life of the IFD. This maximum average cap would include annual pay-as-you-go monies and bond service payments or some combination of both. The maximum average increment cap may be increased to 50% to fund neighborhood infrastructure that also provides clear citywide benefits, like an extension or upgrade of a MUNI light rail line or the development of a City-serving park. In any event, this policy would guarantee that an IFD diversion should always be less than the net fiscal benefit, guaranteeing that there is at least some again to the General Fund in all circumstances. This policy would not prevent the “front-loading” of increment in the beginning years of an IFD to allow for bonding and the acceleration of construction of neighborhood-serving infrastructure, especially since accelerating delivery of infrastructure should have a correspondingly positive effect on property tax revenues for the General Fund.
4. Limit to areas with documented existing infrastructure deficiencies. Because the City has not developed universally-applied and objective citywide standards for assessing the sufficiency (or deficiency) of existing neighborhood-serving infrastructure, BOS-adopted planning documents (like Area Plans) that qualitatively and/or quantitatively describe such deficiencies will suffice until new citywide standards are adopted at a later date. After the adoption of a new IFD policy, the Capital Planning Committee should be tasked with developing a systematic and quantitative set of criteria or standards for assessing existing neighborhood infrastructure deficiencies in the following areas: (i) neighborhood parks & open space improvements; (ii) “Better Streets” streetscape & pedestrian safety improvements; (iii) bicycle network improvements; (iv) transit-supportive improvements; (v) publicly-owned community center and/or child-care facilities. Furthermore, the CPC would need to adopt citywide standards to avoid the use of IFD funds for “gold-plated park benches” or facilities that far exceed citywide norms for cost and quality.
5. Limit use of IFD monies to individual infrastructure projects where a source of long term maintenance funding is identified. Within an IFD, limit expenditure of IFD monies to projects that have identified a separate source of funding for ongoing maintenance and operations. In some cases this could be through public-private agreements, such as a Master HOA agreeing to maintain a public park or a Community Benefit District agreeing to fund long-term maintenance, or via the creation of a new supplemental property tax assessment district, like a Mello-Roos Community Facilities District.

Strategic Criteria

• In general, limit IFDs to parcels without any occupied residential use. The City may want to exclude parcels that contain existing occupied residential structures. This is because IFD law requires an actual voter-based election if there are 12 or more registered voters within the proposed boundaries of an IFD. If there are less than 12 registered voters, the law only requires a weighted vote of the property owners, which, in general, should reduce the complexity and time required for forming a district. On the other hand, there may be circumstances where a voter-based election may be both desirable and manageable.
• Use IFDs as a strategy to leverage additional non-City resources. As noted in Threshold Criteria #1 above, IFDs should be used as a tool to leverage additional regional, state, and federal funds, thereby serving a purpose beyond earmarking General Fund resources for needed infrastructure. In particular, IFDs may prove instrumental in securing matching federal or state dollars for transportation projects.
• Consider adopting a limited policy of “overriding considerations” for situations where the BOS may have adopted zoning that purposely restricts or limits the economic “highest and best” use of a given area, thereby limiting or reducing the net General Fund benefit derived from a rezoning, but where other social policy objectives might dictate that some IFD revenues be spent on supportive infrastructure.